Siemens Healthineers Security Advisory

Remote Code Execution Vulnerability in Apache Log4j

Log4J vulnerabilities update and the impact on Varian Products and Services.

A Varian security advisory has been issued, see here.

WORKAROUNDS AND MITIGATIONS

In some cases, Siemens Healthineers identifies specific workarounds and mitigations for affected products. Customers can access this information through the Siemens Healthineers teamplay Fleet customer online portal. Instructions are reproduced here to maximize access by customers.

1) ATELLICA DATA MANAGER

The log4shell vulnerability may affect some customer configurations of Atellica Data Manager 1.1.1, 1.2.1 and 1.3.1

The vulnerability is applicable to systems that communicate using Java connectivity drivers.
Our analysis has identified a low level of exploitation potential and cybersecurity risk due to the product design.
Connectivity drivers are restricted by default to communicating with authorized IP address only. Note: in Atellica Data Manager, it is the customers responsibly to secure the firewall. Refer to the relevant Atellica Data Manager Security White Paper.
The Log4shell vulnerability is considered controlled.
Atellica Data Manager has multiple security controls which make the possibility of a successful attack remote.
To check if your Atellica Data Manger system is affected, navigate to Start> System Management > Services> Services and check for the presence of services of type “Java communication engine”. This requires System Manager privilege.
Although our analysis has identified this as a low cybersecurity risk to Atellica Data Manager, Siemens will provide a mitigation in a future version.
If you have determined that your Atellica Data Manager has a “Java communication engine” service, and you require an immediate mitigation, then please contact your Siemens Customer Care Center or your local Siemens technical support representative.

2) ATELLICA SOLUTION

A new zero-day remote code execution vulnerability has been found in Log4j java library known as Log4shell (CVE-2021-44228.) The Atellica® Solution is impacted by the Log4shell Vulnerability. We have identified that the Online help component which is “Knowledge Gateway” (KGW) software component is vulnerable to this exploit. Through the analysis by our experts, we have identified a low level of exploitation potential and cybersecurity risk due to the product design. The vulnerability is considered controlled. The product has multiple security controls in place which make the possibility of a successful attack using the Log4shell vulnerabilities remote. KGW is used only for providing user help and does not have connectivity with any other software components. A specific mitigation for this vulnerability is not required at this time. A future update to the software will mitigate this vulnerability.

3) CENTRALINK

The log4shell vulnerability may affect some customer configurations of CentraLink v16.0.2/16.0.3
The vulnerability is applicable to systems that communicate using Java connectivity drivers.
Our analysis has identified a low level of exploitation potential and cybersecurity risk due to the product design.
Connectivity drivers are restricted by default to communicating with authorized IP address only.
The Log4shell vulnerability is considered controlled.
CentraLink has multiple security controls which make the possibility of a successful attack remote.
To check if your CentraLink system is affected, navigate to Start> System Management > Services> Services and check for the presence of services of type “Java communication engine”. This requires System Manager privilege.
If you have determined that your CentraLink has a “Java communication engine” service, and you require a mitigation, then please contact your Siemens Customer Care Center or your local Siemens technical support representative.

4) DICOM Proxy

Note: the information about the mitigation of the CVE-2021-44228 may be changed. The DicomProxy version VB10A is vulnerable to the Log4j vulnerability CVE-2021-44228. This VB10A version uses the Log4j version < 2.16 where we recommend following mitigation:
Linux:
1. Logon to the shell of the DicomProxy (Linux Server)
2. Find the needed program by executing the following command JARTOOL=$(sudo find / -name "jar" -executable | head -n 1)
3. Find the affected Jar files by executing the following command sudo find / -name "log4j-core-2.*.jar"
4. For all files found by the command in step 1 do the following procedure (Exklusions: /tmp folder and log4j versions above or equals 2.16)
Please repeat the following steps for all found files, one by one
JAR=[Filename of one found jar file in step 2]
rm -r /tmp/jar
mkdir /tmp/jar
cd /tmp/jar
$JARTOOL xf $JAR
if the file org/apache/logging/log4j/core/lookup/JndiLookup.class is not found in the subdirectory, this jar is already patched and no further steps need
rm org/apache/logging/log4j/core/lookup/JndiLookup.class
$JARTOOL cfm /tmp/log4j.jar META-INF/MANIFEST.MF *
sudo chown --reference="$JAR" /tmp/log4j.jar
sudo chmod --reference="$JAR" /tmp/log4j.jar
sudo mv /tmp/log4j.jar "$JAR"
5. As soon as possible reboot the computer for the changes to take effect
sudo reboot

Windows:
1. Open the command line with shortcut "Windows + R" and type "cmd" enter
2. Find 7zip with 7z.exe
where /r C:\ 7z.exe
3. Find affected log4j in the DicomProxy RootPath e.g. C:\Siemens\DicomProxy
where /r [DicomProxyRootPath] "log4j-core-2.*.jar"
4. For all files found by the command in step 3 do the following commands (Exklusions: log4j versions above or equals 2.16)
Please repeat the following steps for all found files, one by one
"[Location of 7zip]7z.exe" d [Filename of one found jar file in step 3] org/apache/logging/log4j/core/lookup/JndiLookup.class
If you get an error for step 4. try to identify and stop the application using the jar and repeat this step 4.
5. As soon as possible reboot the computer for the changes to take effect

5) SOMATOM / MAGNETOM

The vulnerability is present on the device.

Log4j is used to give a second workplace access to the online help system of the scanner.
Network traffic from the product should not be routed to the internet.

As an immediate measure prevent inbound network traffic on port 8090 for standalone systems or set up IP whitelisting for "need to access" systems, e.g., a second workplaces, to network port 8090 in case a second console is connected. Preventing access to port 8090 for scanner systems with a second console makes the online help on that workplace unavailable.

6) Symbia and Biograph

The vulnerability is present on the device; However, there is a firewall that is preventing javaw.exe from accessing the network. Therefore, the device is not exploitable over a network and is limited locally to the device.
Siemens recommends the following:
1. Ensure that the device is installed in a secure location
2. Ensure that only those persons who require access to the device is granted access.
Siemens will provide a fix for this in a future security update.

7) syngo Carbon Space

The vulnerable service: Knowledge Gateway (running on port 8090). This service is used to provide online help for the syngo carbon space users. The syngo carbon space VA10A and VA20A uses Knowledge Gateway which deploys the Log4j version 2.13.3 where we recommend following mitigation:
1. Click on “syngo Carbon Space - Stop Server” present on the desktop to stop the server
2. Copy following Jar files to a temporary folder on a Windows PC having 7-Zip installed, e.g. “C:\temp\JarFiles”
a. %KGW_APPLICATION%\bin\kgw-application.jar
b. %KGW_APPLICATION%\bin\kgw-admin-application.jar
3. Open 7 zip manager with administrator privileges
4. Go to the folder “C:\temp\JarFiles\kgw-application.jar\org\apache\logging\log4j\core\lookup\” and delete file “JndiLookup.class”
5. Go to the folder “C:\temp\JarFiles\kgw-admin-application.jar\org\apache\logging\log4j\core\lookup\” and delete file “JndiLookup.class”
7. Close the 7z manager and confirm archive update if prompted.
8. Copy the modified JAR files back to original locations on the syngo Carbon Space server
9. Click on “syngo Carbon Space - Start Server” on the desktop to start the server.

Additionally:
- in case of the VMware usage, please refer to the advisory: https://www.vmware.com/security/advisories/VMSA-2021-0028.html

8) syngo Plaza and syngo.via

The syngo.via and syngo Plaza are vulnerable to the Log4j vulnerability CVE-2021-44228.

The vulnerable process: Knowledge Gateway (process name javaw.exe and listening on port 8090). The service is used to provide online help for the syngo.via users.

This syngo.via version uses Knowledge Gateway which deploys the Log4j version 2.x for which we recommend the following mitigation (available as automated script for syngo.via, please see the instructions below):
1. Click on “syngo.via - Stop Server” present on the APS desktop to stop the server
2. Copy following Jar files to a temporary folder on a Windows PC having 7-Zip installed, e.g. “C:\temp\JarFiles”
a. %KGW_APPLICATION%\bin\kgw-application.jar
b. %KGW_APPLICATION%\bin\kgw-admin-application.jar
c. %KGW_APPLICATION%\work\webapp\webapp\WEB-INF\lib\log4j-core-2.x.2.jar
3. Open 7 zip manager with administrator privileges
4. Go to the folder “C:\temp\JarFiles\kgw-application.jar\org\apache\logging\log4j\core\lookup\” and delete file “JndiLookup.class”
5. Go to the folder “C:\temp\JarFiles\kgw-admin-application.jar\org\apache\logging\log4j\core\lookup\” and delete file “JndiLookup.class”
6. Go to the folder “C:\temp\JarFiles\kgw-application.jar\webapp\WEB-INF\lib\log4j-core-2.x.2.jar”
7. Then double click on “log4j-core-2.x.2.jar”
8. Navigate to “\org\apache\logging\log4j\core\lookup\” then delete file “JndiLookup.class”
9. Go to the folder “C:\temp\JarFiles\log4j-core-2.x.2.jar\org\apache\logging\log4j\core\lookup\” and delete file “JndiLookup.class”
10. Close the 7z manager and confirm archive update if prompted.
11. Copy the modified JAR files back to original locations on the syngo.via server
12. Open command prompt as administrator and run command “%KGW_APPLICATION%\stop.cmd”
13. Click on “syngo.via - Start Server” on the desktop to start the server.

For syngo.via the steps are automated with the following script. To apply the mitigation using the script:
1. Download the Log4j-fix.zip (SHA512 checksum: abecf8c2345b08a47911f949279ba7d8a56b4495b98d3a1ef0fa202aa64f16d09f6049e8275436515b8f4c37ae3bda083aa7273464f3cd6360b71046cd4fdc9d)
2. Unzip Log4j-fix.zip to get the Log4j.bat and copy it to the syngo.via server
3. Run CMD.exe as administrator and start the Log4j.bat
In case of errors, please contact your Customer Service.

Additionally:
- in case of the VMware usage, please refer to the advisory: https://www.vmware.com/security/advisories/VMSA-2021-0028.html

GENERAL SECURITY RECOMMENDATIONS

In addition, Siemens Healthineers generally recommends the following:

Ensure you have appropriate backups and system restoration procedures.

Securely delete any backup files that are no longer needed.

For specific patch and remediation guidance information contact your local Siemens Healthineers

Customer Service Engineer, portal or our Regional Support Center. To find your local contact, please refer to https://www.siemens-healthineers.com/how-can-we-help-you

PRODUCT DESCRIPTION

Additional product information is available through the Siemens Healthineers teamplay Fleet customer online portal.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

For further inquiries on security vulnerabilities in Siemens Healthineers products and solutions, please contact Siemens Healthineers using the following link: https://www.siemens-healthineers.com/cybersecurity

HISTORY DATA

V1.0 (2021-12-18): Publication Date

V1.1 (2021-12-22): Not vulnerable list added. Update Remediations

V1.2 (2021-12-23): Corrections to product lists

V1.3 (2022-01-12):

· Added clarification to help the interpretation of the two lists of products (above each list)

· New SUMMARY paragraph indicating that products not listed are evaluated as not affected

· New SUMMARY paragraph referencing other Log4j vulnerabilities

· Moved PET products from NOT VULNERABLE to POTENTIALLY AFFECTED

· Listed Advia Centaur and VERSANT kPCR products as still under investigation

· All supported versions of CENTRALINK are now listed as POTENTIALLY AFFECTED

· Removed ARTIS icono / pheno VE10 (not affected)

· Removed Artis one VA11 (in development, not released yet)

· Removed SENSIS TS all versions except VD12A (not affected)

· Removed SENSIS VM Server all versions except VD12A (not affected)

V1.4 (2022-01-18):

· Removed last remaining products that were still under investigation

· Removed Centralink from NOT VULNERABLE

· Removed these products since they were not affected: Desktop Connector, MagicLinkA, Resoltion MD, syngo Dynamics, Syngo Imaging, syngo Multimodality Workplace, syngo Share VA30A, syngo.via View&GO, syngo Virtual Cockpit, syngo Workflow SLR, Cios Alpha (VA20) S1, Cios Connect/Fusion (VA20) S1, Cios Select (VA10) S3P, Cios Fit (VA10 / VA11 / VA12)

· Removed unneeded WORKAROUND notes about HPE hardware

· Moved Biograph products from NOT VULNERABLE to POTENTIALLY AFFECTED

V2.0 (2022-02-07):

Removed Atellica Hema Track from NOT VULNERABLE

· Removed references to “Preliminary” advisory

· Changed POTENTIALLY AFFECTED to AFFECTED

· Added patch/update information to AFFECTED list

· Clarified Mitigation references

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